Solution approaches towards verified µ-Kernel

Danny Ziesche August 25, 2017

RheinMain University of Applied Sciences

Outline

Motivation

Methods

Definitions

Results

Conclusions

Open Questions

Motivation

- \cdot kernels should have a high reliability
- in comparison to monolithic kernels small enough to make verification process worthwhile
- trusted codebase
- security concerns

Methods

 \cdot search for (partly) verified $\mu\text{-Kernel}$

- \cdot search for (partly) verified $\mu\text{-Kernel}$
- research which parts are verified and why

- \cdot search for (partly) verified $\mu\text{-Kernel}$
- research which parts are verified and why
- $\cdot\,$ how does the verification process work

- \cdot search for (partly) verified $\mu\text{-Kernel}$
- \cdot research which parts are verified and why
- $\cdot\,$ how does the verification process work
- \cdot compare verifications

• firm understanding about the fundamentals

- \cdot firm understanding about the fundamentals
- \cdot used methods by the $\mu\text{-kernel?}$

- \cdot firm understanding about the fundamentals
- \cdot used methods by the $\mu\text{-kernel?}$
- do we benefit from it?

Definitions

• assist in formalising proofs

- assist in formalising proofs
- no automated process

- assist in formalising proofs
- \cdot no automated process
- human guidance and skill needed

- assist in formalising proofs
- \cdot no automated process
- \cdot human guidance and skill needed
- example theorem prover is isabelle with resolution based on higher-order unification

temporal reasoning

- \cdot temporal reasoning
- derived from FOPL with new temporal operators:

- \cdot temporal reasoning
- derived from FOPL with new temporal operators:
 - $\cdot \ \square$ Always

- \cdot temporal reasoning
- derived from FOPL with new temporal operators:
 - $\cdot \ \square$ Always
 - $\cdot \bigcirc \mathsf{Next}$

- \cdot temporal reasoning
- derived from FOPL with new temporal operators:
 - □ Always
 - $\cdot \bigcirc \mathsf{Next}$
 - $\cdot \diamond$ Eventually

• let M be a state-transition graph

- let M be a state-transition graph
- \cdot let f be a formula of temporal logic

- let M be a state-transition graph
- \cdot let f be a formula of temporal logic
- find all states s of M such that s $\models f$

Results

 \cdot verified only the IPC



Figure 1: RUBIS Mixed Synchronous and Asynchronous Communication

$\Box(P(0) \to Q(0) \land (P(1) \to Q(1)) \land \ldots \land (P(m) \to Q(m)))$

- ports need sound state before reusing
- property expressed as LTL
- $P(p) = (Port_State[p] = CREATED)$
- Q(p) = (empty(Port[p].messages))
- also expressed as promela definition

- \cdot lots of errors related to return codes
- memory management errors

 \cdot verified only the IPC

- \cdot verified only the IPC
- IPC is important and highly concurrent with a complex implementation

- \cdot verified only the IPC
- IPC is important and highly concurrent with a complex implementation
- makes it worthy target for formal methods

- uses spin
- \cdot uses subset of C

 \cdot found mutex bugs

- found mutex bugs
- \cdot found race condition

- found mutex bugs
- \cdot found race condition
- scaling problems

- found mutex bugs
- \cdot found race condition
- scaling problems
- \cdot maintenance problems

- $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$ interactive machine-assisted and machine-checked proof
- proven over 150 invariants
- discovered about 140 bugs
- revealed 150 problems within the specification
- uses theorem prover isabelle/hol
- tries to offload problematic code to userspace (memory management)
- executable specification in haskell subset
- implementation in a C subset



Figure 2: Refinement layers in the verification of seL4

- \cdot claims to have no nullpointer access (the kernel itself)
- functional correctness for the c kernel implementation
- proof maintenance

Conclusions

 $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$

- $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$
- IPC is a high candidate for verification

- $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$
- IPC is a high candidate for verification
- $\cdot\,$ agreement on a subset of standard language

- $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$
- IPC is a high candidate for verification
- $\cdot\,$ agreement on a subset of standard language
- existing code proven with model checker

- $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$
- IPC is a high candidate for verification
- agreement on a subset of standard language
- existing code proven with model checker
- model checker have a short learning curve

- $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$
- IPC is a high candidate for verification
- $\cdot\,$ agreement on a subset of standard language
- existing code proven with model checker
- model checker have a short learning curve
- $\cdot\,$ non-existing code proven with theorem prover

- $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$
- IPC is a high candidate for verification
- agreement on a subset of standard language
- existing code proven with model checker
- model checker have a short learning curve
- non-existing code proven with theorem prover
- \cdot in my estimation seL4 did the most and best job so far

- $\cdot\,$ IPC is obviously an important component for $\mu\text{-kernel}$
- IPC is a high candidate for verification
- agreement on a subset of standard language
- existing code proven with model checker
- model checker have a short learning curve
- non-existing code proven with theorem prover
- \cdot in my estimation seL4 did the most and best job so far
- $\cdot \Rightarrow$ seems to be a general pattern to $\mu\text{-kernel}$ verification

Open Questions

- \cdot languages with built-in mechanisms for formal verification
- \cdot languages which are designed to make verification easier
- \cdot verification of compilers

"Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it."

— Donald E. Knuth

Questions?