


School of Computer Science & Engineering

COMP9242 Advanced Operating Systems

2019 T2 Week 05b Microkernel Design & Implementation

The 25-year quest for the right API

@GernotHeiser



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L4 Microkernels – Deployed by the Billions





L4: The Quest for a Real Microkernel




L4: The Quest for a Real Microkernel



A concept is tolerated inside the microkernel only if moving it outside the kernel, i.e. permitting competing implementations, would prevent the implementation of the system's required functionality. [Liedtke, SOSP'95]



L4: 25 Years High Performance Microkernels





L4 IPC Performance Over the Years

Name	Year	Processor	MHz	Cycles	μs
Original	1993	i486	50	250	5.00
Original	1997	Pentium	160	121	0.75
L4/MIPS	1997	R4700	100	86	0.86
L4/Alpha	1997	21064	433	45	0.10
Hazelnut	2002	Pentium 4	1,400	2,000	1.38
Pistachio	2005	Itanium	1,500	36	0.02
OKL4	2007	XScale 255	400	151	0.64
NOVA	2010	i7 Bloomfield (32-bit)	2,660	288	0.11
seL4	2013	ARM11	532	188	0.35
seL4	2018	i7 Haswell (64-bit)	3,400	442	0.13
seL4	2018	Cortex A9	1,000	303	0.30

6



Minimality: Source-Code Size

Name	Architecture	C/C++	asm	total kSLOC
Original	i486	0	6.4	6.4
L4/Alpha	Alpha	0	14.2	14.2
L4/MIPS	MIPS64	6.0	4.5	10.5
Hazelnut	x86	10.0	0.8	10.8
Pistachio	x86	22.4	1.4	23.0
L4-embedded	ARMv5	7.6	1.4	9.0
OKL4 3.0	ARMv6	15.0	0.0	15.0
Fiasco.OC	x86	36.2	1.1	37.6
seL4	ARMv6	9.7	0.5	10.2



What Have We Learnt in 25 Years?




Issues With 2G Microkernels

- L4 solved microkernel performance [Härtig et al, SOSP'97] left a number of issues unsolved
- Problem: ad-hoc approach to security and resource management
 - Global thread name space \Rightarrow covert channels [Shapiro'03]
 - Threads as IPC targets \Rightarrow insufficient encapsulation
 - Single kernel memory pool \Rightarrow DoS attacks
 - No delegation of authority \Rightarrow impacts flexibility, performance
 - Unprincipled management of time

Solved by capabilities



Traditional L4: Recursive Address Spaces





Issues With 2G Microkernels


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Solved by seL4 memory management model




Direct vs Indirect IPC Addressing

- Direct: Queue senders/messages at receiver
 - Need unique thread IDs
 - Kernel guarantees identity of sender
 - useful for authentication
- Indirect: Mailbox/port object
 - Just a user-level handle for the kernel-level queue
 - Extra object type extra weight?
 - Communication partners are anonymous
 - Need separate mechanism for authentication





Other Issues with L4 IPC Adressing



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Solved by caps & endpoints

- No delegation of authority \Rightarrow impacts flexibility, performance
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
Examine later






Other Design & Implementation Issues






Sender address space










IPC Fastpath: Send Phase of Call

Running	 Prologue Save minimal state, get args Identify destination Cap lookup; get endpoint; check queue Get receiver TCB Check receiver can still run Check receiver priority is ≥ ours Mark sender blocked and enqueue Create reply cap & insert in slot Switch to receiver Leave message registers untouc Nuke reply cap 	 Wait to receive 301 cycles on Arm A9 Direct process switch: no scheduler invocation time-slice donation hed
Wait to receive	6) Epilogue (restore & return)	Running
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




How About Real-Time Support?


- Kernel runs with interrupts disabled
 - No concurrency control \Rightarrow simpler kernel
 - Easier reasoning about correctness
 - Better average-case performance

How about longrunning system calls?






sel4 Incremental Consistency Paradigm






Sel4 Example: Destroying IPC Endpoint






Sel4 Difficult Example: Revoking Badge








24






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
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
L4 Scheduler Optimisation: Lazy Scheduling








- Frequent blocking/unblocking in IPC-based systems
- Many ready-queue manipulations






Scheduler Optimisation: Direct Process Switch




Remember: Delegation of Critical Sections

29




Sel4 New Model: Scheduling Contexts





Sel4 Delegation with Scheduling Contexts



Scheduling-context capabilities: a principled, light-weight OS mechanism for managing time [Lyons et al, EuroSys'18]

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
Mixed-Criticality Support

For supporting *mixed-criticality systems* (MCS), OS must provide:

- *Temporal isolation*, to force jobs to adhere to declared WCET
- Mechanisms for *safely sharing resources* across criticalities

What if budget expires while shared server executing on Low's schedduling context?

Solved by



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32





Policy-free mechanism for dealing with budget depletion

Possible actions:

- Provide emergency budget to leave critical section
- Cancel operation & roll-back server
- Reduce priority of low-crit client (together with one of the above)
- Implement priority inheritance (if you must...)



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Solved by scheduling contexts & time-out exceptions



Lessons & Principles



Original L4 Design and Implementation

Modified

Retained

Implement. Tricks [SOSP'93]

- Process kernel
- Virtual TCB array
- Lazy scheduling
- Direct process switch
- Non-preemptible
- Non-portable
- Non-standard calling convention
- Assembler

Design Decisions [SOSP'95]

- Synchronous IPC
- Rich message structure, arbitrary out-of-line messages
- Zero-copy register messages
- User-mode page-fault handlers
- Threads as IPC destinations
- IPC timeouts
- Hierarchical IPC control
- User-mode device drivers
- Process hierarchy
- Recursive address-space construction



Reflecting on Changes

Original L4 design had two major shortcomings:

- 1. Insufficient/impractical resource control
 - Poor/non-existent control over kernel memory use
 - Inflexible & costly process hierarchies (policy!)
 - Arbitrary limits on number of address spaces and threads (policy!)
 - Poor information hiding (IPC addressed to threads)
 - Insufficient mechanisms for authority delegation
- 2. Over-optimised IPC abstraction, mangles:
 - Communication
 - Synchronisation
 - Memory management sending mappings
 - Scheduling time-slice donation





- Fully delegatable access control
- All resource management is subject to user-defined policies
 - Applies to kernel resources too!
- Performance on par with best-performing L4 kernels
 - Prerequisite for real-world deployment!
- Suitability for real-time use
 - Important for safety-critical systems
- Suitable for *formal verification*
 - Requires small size, avoid complex constructs

Largely in line with traditional L4 approach!



A Thirty-Year Dream!

1. Introduction

Operating Systems R. Stockton Gaines Editor

Specification and Verification of the UCLA Unix† Security Kernel

Bruce J. Walker, Richard A. Kemmerer, and Gerald J. Popek University of California, Los Angeles

Data Secure Unix, a kernel structured operating system, was constructed as part of an ongoing effort at UCLA to develop procedures by which operating systems can be produced and shown secure. Program verification methods were extensively applied as a constructive means of demonstrating security enforcement.

Here we report the specification and verification experience in producing a secure operating system. The work represents a significant attempt to verify a largescale, production level software system, including all aspects from initial specification to verification of implemented code.

Key Words and Phrases: verification, security, operating systems, protection, programming methodology, ALPHARD, formal specifications, Unix, security kernel

CR Categories: 4.29, 4.35, 6.35

Early attempts to make operating systems secure merely found and fixed flaws in existing systems. As these efforts failed, it became clear that piecemeal alterations were unlikely ever to succeed [20]. A more systematic method was required, presumably one that controlled the system's design and implementation. Then secure operation could be demonstrated in a stronger sense than an ingenuous claim that the last bug had been eliminated, particularly since production systems are rarely static, and errors easily introduced.

Our research seeks to develop means by which an operating system can be shown data secure, meaning that direct access to data must be possible only if the recorded protection policy permits it. The two major components of this task are: (1) developing system architectures that minimize the amount and complexity of software involved in both protection decisions and enforcement, by isolating them into kernel modules; and (2) applying extensive verification methods to that kernel software in order to prove that our of data security criterion is met. This paper reports on the latter part, the verification experience. Those interested in architectural issues should see [23]. Related work includes the PSOS operating system project at SRI [25] which uses the hierarchical design methodology described by Robinson and Levitt in [26], and efforts to prove communications software at the University of Texas [31].

Every verification step, from the development of toplevel specifications to machine-aided proof of the Pascal code, was carried out. Although these steps were not completed for all portions of the kernel, most of the job was done for much of the kernel. The remainder is clearly more of the same. We therefore consider the project essentially complete. In this paper, as each verification step is discussed, an estimate of the completed portion of that step is given, together with an indication of the amount of work required for completion. One should realize that it is essential to carry the verification process through the steps of actual code-level proofs because most security flaws in real systems are found at this level [20]. Security flaws were found in our system during verification, despite the fact that the implementation was written carefully and tested extensively. An example of

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