http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/world/asia/transcript-of-new-york-times-interview-with-president-ma-ying-jeou-of-taiwan.html 2014-11-01 02:13:52 Transcript of New York Times Interview With President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan An official transcript from the office of President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan of an interview with The New York Times. === Following is a transcript, provided by the Taiwanese government, of an interview with President Ma Ying-jeou conducted by The New York Times in Taipei on Friday. Mr. Ma mainly spoke in Chinese, but briefly answered a question in English. Read the full story Q. The first question we wanted to ask is, since we have APEC coming up in a week and a half, what has Beijing lost and what has A: Q. You’ve voiced support for democracy in A: Another key point is that we believe that if mainland China can practice democracy in Hong Kong or if mainland China itself can become more democratic, then we can shorten the psychological distance between people from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This would be a great step toward creating closer cross-strait ties over the long term. Q. Xi Jinping seemed to be voicing more support for the “one country, two systems” approach even for Taiwan earlier this week as opposed to the 1992 consensus. Have events in Hong Kong, in your view, made China potentially more eager for a more controlling role in long-term bilateral relations with Taiwan? A: Q. Changing subjects to trade. There are two competing visions now for trade in the Pacific. There’s Beijing’s Ftaap — the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific — and then there’s also the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Washington is suggesting. Which do you think fits Taiwan’s economy better? Which has more appeal for you? A: It must be understood that Taiwan is quite behind the rest of Asia in terms of signing free trade agreements (F.T.A.s) and joining in regional economic integration. Ascertaining whether a country is making sufficient efforts on these fronts involves looking at what percent of its exports is covered by F.T.A.s. For Singapore, it exceeds 70 percent, meaning that over 70 percent of Singapore’s exports are covered by F.T.A.s, so they are subject to lower-tariff, or even zero-tariff treatment. Sometimes these exports are also free from other, nontariff barriers. But for Taiwan, the figure is 10 percent, or just under 10 percent. As a result, we do not enjoy equal treatment vis-à-vis our competitors, meaning that our products’ market share in other countries will gradually shrink. This is a matter of life and death for us, because 70 percent of our G.D.P. growth is dependent on foreign trade. Q. Do you have any regrets that Taiwan did not make a bigger effort, then, to be included in the first round of T.P.P.? A: When nations sign free trade agreements, it is primarily for economic reasons. There are, of course, political implications. For the Republic of China, political interference is greater [than that affecting other countries]. We do not enjoy diplomatic ties with our main trading partners. When we want to trade with them, it’s fine, but when we seek an F.T.A., they hesitate for fear that mainland China will oppose it. This is one reason few countries were, in the past, willing to sign F.T.A.s with us. After I took office, we signed the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (E.C.F.A.) with our largest trading partner, mainland China. Since then, we have signed an investment agreement with Japan, an economic cooperation agreement with New Zealand and an economic partnership agreement with Singapore. We hope to sign similar agreements with our main trading partners in Asia and Europe by simultaneously contacting many countries and negotiating accords with them one by one. We realize that this will not be easy, because there will always be politically motivated interference. Q. I’d like to ask about the fishing agreement with Japan surrounding Diaoyu Islands and the waters there. Has that eased tensions, and was that agreement something you discussed with Beijing beforehand? A: Coincidentally, the situation concerning the Diaoyutai Islands changed about this time. The result of Japan’s nationalization of the islands aroused opposition among the people of both Taiwan and mainland China. At this time, I proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative, concerned that should increased tensions lead to regional conflict, this would be extremely detrimental to the engine of global economic growth. It would not only affect Asian nations. I proposed the initiative on August 5, 2012. Japan responded in November, stating that they were willing to talk with us about this issue, and within five months, we had an agreement. In the year before we signed, we had 17 clashes over fishing rights, sometimes leading to standoffs between our nations’ respective coast guards. Since the agreement’s signing, there has been but one, for which there was no standoff and which was resolved quickly. So that’s the political implication. Economically, both sides have enjoyed larger catches, especially of high-quality fish like bluefin tuna. This has been beneficial to the fishermen of both sides. So we have achieved both peace and prosperity. We have set sovereignty questions aside, not allowing these to hinder resource development and relevant negotiations. Q. Do you see any possibility in reaching a similar arrangement with mainland China? A: However, the thinking in the East China Sea Peace Initiative, which I proposed, is that the three parties — mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan — could split up to conduct three sets of parallel bilateral dialogues: Japan-mainland China, mainland China-Taiwan and Taiwan-Japan, to carry out negotiations on various issues involving marine issues. These could include fisheries development, At present, Japan and mainland China, as well as Taiwan and Japan, have concluded separate fisheries agreements. In addition, we have carried out sea rescue exercises with mainland China for many years. All these developments are positive. Perhaps we can step by step build three bilateral mechanisms; then, if conditions are appropriate, it could perhaps become one trilateral mechanism. Q. Do you expect in the near future to deal with the Philippines on judicial cooperation in the Bashi Strait? And can that be the beginning of a broader cooperation with the Philippines on maritime issues? A: Both parties reached consensus on these points last year, although we have yet to sign an agreement; nevertheless, only one point of contention remains. The closest distance between the Philippines and Taiwan is less than 200 nautical miles. If both sides were to demarcate their respective E.E.Z.s (exclusive economic zone), there would be an overlap of over 100 nautical miles. Under such conditions, this sort of a law enforcement agreement will help reduce causes of dispute. However, looking at the long term, attaining a fisheries agreement will require much more time and effort. In 1898, the United States fought a war with Spain over the Philippines. After the U.S. won, the Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain ceded sovereignty over the Philippines to the U.S. However, since there are more than 7,000 Philippine islands, it was difficult to clearly demarcate the area. So they just used latitude and longitude to roughly demarcate this area. However, after the Philippines gained independence in 1946, it regarded all of the area within the latitude and longitude coordinates as its offshore waters. Some of the islands within this area are more than 100 nautical miles from the boundary lines. Under such conditions, it is easy for our fishing vessels to inadvertently enter what the Philippines sees as its territorial waters. Since this is stipulated by the constitution of the Philippines, it is difficult for them to deal with this issue. Before these issues are resolved, it will be difficult to sign a fisheries agreement. The Philippines often complains that our fishermen transgress their borders to fish, entering their territorial waters or E.E.Z. So, after we reached consensus, we have repeatedly told our fishermen that if they operate legally, we will protect them. However, if they enter the territorial waters of the Philippines, we cannot do so. Thus, our policy for the protection of fishermen is to “protect fishing, not wrongdoing.” Q. Given that the consensus with the Philippines and the agreement with Japan seem to be reducing tensions in those directions, do you want Taiwan to play a greater role in the South China Sea, particularly with regard to the Philippines’ claims, but also even Malaysia and Vietnam, and particularly given that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China have the same historical antecedents for their respective claims? A: There is a basic principle in the In the East China Sea, we are in fact following this kind of logic. When we signed the fisheries agreement with Japan, we did not abandon our sovereignty claim. We regard the Diaoyutais as territory of the Republic of China, and offshore islands appertaining to Taiwan. This stance has never changed. However, in the fourth article of the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, it says that the actions or measures adopted by both parties under this agreement do not affect our rights and interests under the Law of the Sea. By using this approach to shelve our disputes temporarily, the problem became smaller, not larger. Following this sort of resolution, in the future, if there is the opportunity, we can still explore issues pertaining to sovereignty; otherwise, we can explore other issues of resource development, such as oil and gas, or other newly discovered resources that I just mentioned. If the South China Sea issues can be approached from this angle, perhaps solutions can be found to some of them. Q. Taiwan has expressed interest in developing its own submarines. How important is that to Taiwan? And if you go ahead with developing your own submarines, would you rely on technology from the U.S. and do you expect to get that? A: Q. Where does that stand? I understand that you have formal requests to the United States. Have you received any reply on obtaining submarine technology that would allow you to build subs in your own shipyards? A: Q. Is there a formal recent request you made? I have heard different versions on this, a formal recent request for submarine technology that you would build into vessels that would actually be assembled in Taiwanese shipyards. Or was it not an actual recent formal request for a specific technology that would allow you to do this at all? A: Q. Taiwanese companies have conspicuously not been punished in recent months as China has confronted multinationals from the United States, Europe and Japan, accusing them of offenses like breaking antimonopoly laws. Is this because Taiwan has an understanding with China that they are not going after your companies, that you are somehow exempt from the economic nationalism because they see you as part of China? Why is it that Taiwanese companies seem to have this exemption from the current crackdown on foreign companies, more broadly, in China? A: You just mentioned antimonopoly laws. Could it be because Taiwan’s businesses are not so large and therefore are less likely to violate these laws? I am not sure about that. Q. Do you foresee a way to address the pork issue with the United States such that you can get a bilateral investment agreement done with the United States before you leave office? A: With regards to beef, after many rounds of negotiations with the U.S., we now permit the import of beef with a maximum residue limit of 10 pbb. This problem has now been resolved. The U.S. said two years ago that beef and pork imports could be discussed separately, and we have proceeded accordingly. Therefore, the two sides will need to conduct further discussions on this issue. Second, pork accounts for a very small proportion of U.S. exports to the R.O.C. We have opened our market to U.S. pork. The only restriction is that pork containing ractopamine is not allowed. U.S. pork exports, whether to Russia, the European Union, or mainland China, do not contain ractopamine. Taiwan imports a very small volume of U.S. pork, far less than Russia, the E.U., or mainland China. We see no reason why pork exported to Taiwan cannot be ractopamine-free. We do not think that this is a big issue. It should not impede our negotiations with the U.S. on a number of other issues, especially a bilateral investment agreement. Otherwise it would be a shame because U.S. exports very little pork to Taiwan. I do not think that the slogan we now hear — no pork, no talks — is very wise. Q. Do you have any concern that Taiwan’s ever-growing economic ties to the mainland, and now that mainland China has passed the United States as the biggest trading partner of Taiwan, mean that Taiwan is losing its political and security flexibility, that it is becoming too dependent on China economically? A: Mainland China is the largest trading partner of 17 of its 23 neighboring countries. Their bilateral trade values are extremely high because mainland China is the world’s second largest economy and largest exporter. We can take a look at U.S. relations with Canada and Mexico. The three countries have formed a North American free trade area. About 75 percent of Mexican and Canadian exports are destined for the U.S., while the U.S. supplies about 50 percent of their respective total imports. Therefore, their bilateral trade dependence is 65 percent, which is far higher than that in cross-strait trade. Some people might say that U.S. relations with Canada and Mexico are different from cross-strait ties. Their political relations are certainly different. Economically, however, the countries are located in close proximity, share similar cultures and ethnic backgrounds, as well as close relations. That they would have a large trade volume is inevitable. If mainland China were to account for only 10 percent of our total trade and the U.S., 50 percent, it would be [almost] impossible economically. However, this happened before. I remember when I had just returned from the U.S., around 1981 to 1988, half or more than half of Taiwan’s exports were destined for the U.S. Our trade with mainland China and other countries gradually became more balanced. Things change. Judging from the present situation, we have not yet become over-dependent on mainland China. Our trade with the mainland has indeed continued to increase, but its share of total trade has decreased. The present situation warrants our attention but does not call for excessive anxiety. Q. Going back to your support for democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan had protests earlier this year. Many people pointed out similarities between the two. While the details are different, the fundamental issue concerns the influence of China. But you were also critical of the protests here. Do you see any contradiction in your standpoint, or do you see any similarities or differences between the two protest movements? A: After seeing that their first demand had been accepted, they made a second. They called for the establishment of an oversight act for agreements between Taiwan and mainland China. A month prior to this, the KMT party caucus in the Legislative Yuan had reached consensus with the Executive Yuan on creating a four-stage oversight mechanism. On April 3, before the protest movement ended, the Executive Yuan approved a draft of such an act and sent it to the Legislative Yuan. Today, more than six months later, the draft still has not gotten through the legislature. Meanwhile, the students called for dialogue with the government. On March 22, Premier Jiang walked from the Executive Yuan to the Legislative Yuan, and went among the crowd gathered there for a discussion. But the students said that the trade in services agreement should first be withdrawn before they would engage in dialogue. As far as I know, this was the first time that the highest-ranking official of the executive branch of the R.O.C. government went into a group of protesters to discuss their demands — it was really quite something. However, he was rejected, and walked back to the Executive Yuan. Even though the students requested dialogue with government officials, when a government official came to talk with them, he was turned away. The next day, I held a press conference explaining the government’s position. On March 25, I came out and said that I was willing to exchange views with students at the office of the president. Such a meeting would be public and could have been broadcast on television. In total, I issued an invitation for dialogue seven times, but each time, the students put forward reasons for not wanting to meet with me. For example, if we were to meet, they said, I could not request that the KMT party caucus in the Legislative Yuan exercise party discipline. They also said that a meeting should not be held in the office of the president, but on Kaitakelan Boulevard. I wonder how things are in other countries, but I, as president, extended seven invitations to speak with students, and though these were all rejected, I believe we did our part as a responsive government. In fact, we met most of their demands, except for withdrawing the trade in services agreement and renegotiating it. We could not have agreed to that demand. Doing so would be unacceptable in the international arena. If we had done so, the international community would regard us as an unreliable trade partner, which would then affect our ability to sign similar agreements with other countries. So I have mentioned two differences, which are the goals of the protests as well as the responses of the respective governments. The students fundamentally disagree with our mainland China policy. In fact, our mainland China policy has had the support of a large majority of our people. They [the protesters] believe that the trade in services agreement is a black box accord, but in fact, before being sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation, it was handled with the highest degree of transparency since constitutional rule was instituted in the R.O.C. Before the agreement was signed by the two sides on June 21 of last year, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (M.O.E.A.) held 110 rounds of consultations with 264 representatives from 46 service-economy sectors. For each of these there is a record. In addition, before the agreement was sent to the Legislative Yuan, three formal reports were made to relevant committees of the Legislative Yuan. After it was sent to the Legislative Yuan, the M.O.E.A. held more than 140 large-scale seminars, which were attended by more than 7,900 people. In March of this year, before the legislative review had started, 20 public hearings were held. Since the R.O.C. Legislative Yuan was established, no bill has been afforded this much time or deliberation. Nevertheless, it still is regarded as a black box process. With the agreement having already entered the Legislative Yuan, and with so many public hearings having been organized, how can it still be regarded as not transparent? The key point is that they [the opposition] do not want this bill to be reviewed [by the Legislative Yuan]. They want to block it from moving forward. In Western democracies, if the opposition wants to block a bill from moving forward, a Economists in Taiwan believe that as a result of the trade in services agreement, our service exports to mainland China will grow by 37 percent, while mainland Chinese service exports to Taiwan will only increase by nine percent. The agreement will thus be more beneficial to Taiwan. This is why we believe that the agreement should still be passed. This year we are holding elections, so the current session of the Legislative Yuan is relatively short. However, we hope that both the governing and opposition parties are aware of the international challenges that Taiwan faces. Regardless of which party is in power, these challenges will have to be met. Blocking the agreement will only result in lowering Taiwan’s competitive standing. That is why I want to emphasize again that regarding the protest movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan, we welcome democracy, but oppose violence. No democratic country can allow its legislature or executive government agencies to be occupied by anyone, including students. That’s violence, not democracy.